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ABSTRACT: It is argued that spatial expressions come together
with an encoding of the space called "aspect", which changes as
we climb up the syntactic tree. The changing nature of aspect is
necessary in order to simplify the meanings of elements. What
appears to be a rather peculiar property of an element will be
perfectly natural once we acknowledge that the elements compute
on the space viewed in a particular way. Coordinates are always
rooted in the landmark, for example. Thus, for the purpose of
the distinction between static and dynamic it is not the "absolute"
motion of the figure that counts, but the motion relative to the
landmark.
1. INTRODUCTION
Model theoretic semantics (MTS) is in disarray. For some it has lost
relevance since it only deals with arbitrary models (in addition to the
real one, whatever that may be), for others it is utterly trivial and fails
to address the hard questions of semantics; and for yet others it is just a
sort of glasperlenspiel. As much as I wish to agree with these points the
problem is that the concerns over MTS will not go away by ignoring
MTS as a result. We are still facing the problem of saying what the
meaning of a complex expression is and how we get it by manipulating
the meanings of its parts. And we still have to admit that “snow is
white” is true if (and only if) snow is (in fact) white.
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However, advocates of model theoretic semantics have become com-
placent. Rather than addressing these problems head on they have
simply stayed on course, trusting in the superiority of their approach.
Worse still, when it comes to recent additions to our stock of primitives,
like events and situations, nobody bothers to tell us what the models
look like, so that all we are left with is formulae without any indica-
tion how the model actually makes them true. For events cannot be
independent of the individuals and the actions that these individuals
perform, and these dependencies between the elements of various cat-
egories capture essential properties of them that the models need to
respect. Instead of trying to improve the situation, type theoretic se-
mantics has become a free for all: Invent a new type, add it to the
primitives – and you are all set.
This is unsatisfactory. If anything, we would like to expand our
semantic vocabulary and rest assured that we can not only write down
formulae but also say something significant about the models.
The cognitive turn in linguistics has also added another kind of
model to worry about: the mental model. That which is in our heads.
It is unfortunate that some people like to insist that this is the only kind
of model we need to study. For, if there is any sense in talking about
reality, we ought to be interested in knowing what that reality actually
is. There can be a host of different mental models, at the end of the day
disagreements can only be settled by turning to outside reality.
Of course, one may object that each one of us sees that reality dif-
ferently. Moreover, some areas of semantics cannot be said to be about
the outside world as it is here and now, for example as propositional
attitudes, and – to some extent – intensionality. Still, there are areas
where all of this seems not to get in our way. Space is one such area.
We seem to be firmly committed to the view not only that there are
some intersubjectively testable intuitions about space that can tell us
whether you or I are wrong about certain claims, but also that there
is a science whose success is beyond doubt, which aims to uncover the
real nature of space. That science is called physics. If physics is simply
a big blunder and there is no objective space then I would like to know
what it is that explains how physics can deliver with such precision.
In other words: we know in enough detail what the real world looks
like when it comes to space. Cognitive linguistics and other empirical
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sciences on the other hand have, based on this knowledge, also shown
how that space is coded in our minds. Maybe we do not know enough
yet. But, as I shall argue here, we know so much already that it is pos-
sible to show how model theoretic semantics and linguistics as well as
the cognitive sciences can learn from each other in a nontrivial way. In
particular, I will show that the meaning of a spatial expression involves
a sophisticated algorithm of (re)coding the space that makes claims of
compositionality quite nontrivial.1
2. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
I shall be concerned here with the meaning of locative PPs like
(1) on the mat
Standardly, they involve two objects, called here “figure” and “ground”,
where these have their usual meaning. The PP locates the figure in
terms of the ground at the time of the event.
The argumentation used here is as follows. Expressions can be
translated into a mental model (or cognitive map) or into a real model
(as MTS uses it, but with emphasis on physical reality). I shall scruti-
nize what the semantics can legitimately say if it takes the expressions
to denote something in the real world. So, model here means at least
the real physical model. Second, we shall use the linguistic structure of
these expressions to arrive at a componential analysis that is supposed
to reveal a cascade of cognitive processes that change what I call the
aspect of the space. This allows us to say how the real model is mapped
into the cognitive model. Semantics is then derivative: by translating
expressions into cognitively informed maps, the objective content can
be found by undoing this cascade of codings.
The main source is Kracht (2008), where a detailed account of the
model theory is given. The present paper will not be as technical. This
is because I now think it is actually more important to understand the
philosophical and physical background, and that that can be explained
without a lot of mathematical machinery. The present discussion may
actually serve as a motivation to read the paper just quoted.
I shall not deal much with syntax or morphology, though I shall
make some occasional remarks on these matters.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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The methodological issues can be used to analyze other expressions
as well (verbs of stasis and motion, spatial adjectives etc), but I did not
want to venture into that territory. It would make the exposition less
coherent (and hence more confusing).
Also, much of what I say can equally be said about time. Yet, time
will figure only marginally in this discussion.
3. MOTIVATION
There is a modern mythology around how space functions that is in-
compatible with both physics and cognition, though as we shall see it
is incompatible in different ways. And this is the mythology of an abso-
lute space, with coordinates to locate objects, in the way we are being
taught in high school. This space appears to us nowadays – thanks also
to modern technology – so much more natural than everything else,
though that naturality is more apparent than real. I shall argue here
that it has very little to offer for semantics.
The idea of an absolute space is that space is “at rest”, provid-
ing a container (called aether) in which objects are being placed and
can move around. Fix an origin in this aether, and some coordinate
frame, and points can henceforth be equated with triples of numbers
(or quadruples if you add time), also called vectors. So, the sentence
(2) The cat is near the mat.
is true if and only if the set of differences ~x − ~y where ~x is a vector
(= triple of numbers) from the set of cat-points and ~y a vector from
the set of mat-points, contains some vectors of relatively small length
(however that may be spelled out in detail).
But we may ask: for whom could such a definition be useful or
even explanatory? Not for humans, since they do not know how to
calculate these vectors. Not for physicists, since they will insist that
the coordinates associated with points are not unique, not even the
differences (they are not immune to rescaling, for example). Not for
cognitive scientists, since they will have the same trouble as the others
identifying such “absolute” coordinates.
Note. The vector semantics of Zwarts & Winter (2000) can easily
be reformulated in terms of points in a space. That the authors use the
word “vector” where I prefer “point” is actually inessential for their aim.
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4. ABSOLUTE SPACE
Physicists will say that a physical theory must be invariant under trans-
lation. By that they mean that if the laws are expressed in terms of co-
ordinates then moving the origin of the coordinate frame somewhere
else must not change the expression of the laws. In fact, rather than
expressing location in terms of absolute position we can only express
it in terms of relative position. But relative to what? The aether the-
ory would say: in relation to the space itself. Modern physics says: in
relation to other objects only. To see the point of the exercise, try iden-
tifying your location in a space that is absolutely empty. (To appreciate
the scale of the problem, ask yourself how you can find out where you
are in a desert.) There is actually nothing that you can do, since lo-
cating a point in space can be done only by means of objects. And we
know of no object that is fixed in space; more exactly, we have found
no evidence and no diagnostic that would point to the existence of such
objects. What goes for humans, however, goes for the physical objects
as well. There is no reality to space. It is constituted by matter (and
energy) alone. As strange as that sounds.
The physicist Ernst Mach had a similar problem with respect to ro-
tation. He asked: When there is no other body in space except for a
single sphere, then how can you tell it is rotating? Even worse: how
can the sphere tell it is rotating? And his answer was that it can’t. There
is nothing (=no thing) by means of which the sphere could diagnose its
own rotation. It might just as well assume it is not rotating at all. Hence
the forces that act on it when rotating cannot be attributed to its rotat-
ing in absolute space. And so we get the following principle, attributed
by Einstein to Mach, maybe erroneously so, see Norton (1995). (The
formulation is the one given in Wikipedia.)
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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[Mach’s Principle]
Any phenomena that would seem attributable to absolute
space and time (e.g. inertia, and centrifugal force) should
instead be seen as emerging from the large scale distribu-
tion of matter in the universe.
We know the rest: the notion of absolute space was dealt a blow with
the Michelson-Morley Experiment in 1887. It shows essentially that
absolute space does not exist. For it establishes that no matter in what
direction we send a light beam, its velocity is the same. Assuming that
the earth is in motion (at 30km/s around the sun), one would have
to expect a difference of up to the speed of the earth. But none was
observed. So, all coordinate frames are just arbitrarily selected. Coor-
dinates are not intrinsic properties of space points nor of objects. And
so on.2
What is true in physics is true a fortiori for humans. We can have
no sensors that detect what coordinates we inhabit at a given moment
– this is a physical impossibility. Hence to ask for a procedure like the
one given above – taking triples of numbers for locations, calculating
differences thereof and so on – is asking for the impossible. On the
other hand, there does seem to be a clear difference between someone
who is moving and someone who is not. How can that be?
Before I move on let me say that the mathematical theory of space
as exposed here actually does assume an aether. It says that there is,
say, a structure O = (O, C), where O is a set of points, and C some
relational structure on these points. I shall occasionally reveal what C
must minimally contain in order to get the semantics off the ground.
For example, we will have a notion of distance. Given two points o and
o′, d(o, o′) is a positive real number. (There are issues of calibration,
to which I shall return.) I think that even if physical space is different,
cognitively we do think of space as an inhabited aether. The problem
is how it gets fixed in practical terms.
5. MORE OR LESS ABSOLUTE SPACE
The idea is that motion is constituted by a change in distance from
a certain object. Not just any object, of course. For us, the earth is a
suitable reference point. We take it to be at rest and calculate everything
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with respect to it. To do that we take landmarks, whose position we
deem to be fixed relative to it (and consequently relative to each other),
like mountains, rivers, trees and houses. The stars and the sun could be
used, but care must be exercised as their relative position is changing
slowly over time. There is thus a hierarchy of stability that we exploit
to tell whether someone or something is moving or at rest.
In terms of Cartesian coordinates we need an origin, a point that
the location of all other points makes reference to. Ideally, we would
like that point to be fixed once and for all. But that is not how it works.
It is unrealistic to assume a single absolute origin for everyone at all
times. This is impractical. To be able to tell whether (2) is true we do
not really need to know whether either of the two, the cat or the mat,
are moving. We do not need to be able to calculate coordinates if only
we can calculate distances. This, it seems, we can do. The notion of
nearness does not answer to positions but only to distances.
[Step 1]
In a locative expression, the location of the figure is calcu-
lated only with respect to the location of the ground. We
take the latter as the origin of space.
What does that mean? Consider the expression “near the mat” in
(2). It involves the ground object “mat”. In deciding whether the figure
is in the relation of nearness, we may as well consider the mat as the
origin of a coordinate frame and calculate everything with respect to it.
This origin is quite a temporary one: it is agreed on by the PP “on the
mat” and used within the sentence. Outside of it, any other origin may
be used.
At this point the way we picture the space, what I call its aspect,
has changed. We no longer see it as a collection of points with some
properties, we see it as a collection where one point, the center c of the
mat, is being distinguished. Our new structure is (O, c, C), where c is
the origin. But more is going on. Instead of seeing our points as points
we may also now refer to them using c. We shall change the way we
address them. We recode them. The point p will be recoded as the vec-
tor
−−−→
(c, p). This vector is a particular set of pairs of space points, namely
those pairs that have same length and direction as
−−−→
(c, p). This is the
familiar notion of a vector used in physics (e.g. the force vector). In
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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a Euclidean space these are the vectors that are being used in transla-
tions. Vectors have a structure: they can be added, for example. Thus,
as we set the origin, we can address each point p by its vector
−−−→
(c, p). The
function f1 : p 7→
−−−→
(c, p) is one-to-one (= injective). Its image is a struc-
ture V := (V,+,−, ~0, Ĉ , c), where +, − are the operations of addition
and inverse of vectors, ~0 := f1(c), and Ĉ is the image of the relations of
C under the function f1. Notice that by corollary we can form multiples
n ·~v, where ~v is a vector and n an integer. Assuming a suitable topology
on the vector space so that the operations become continuous, we can
define a multiplication r · ~v, where r is a real number. Thus we have
a real vector space of dimension 3, which I also denote by V. Before
moving on let us note that I have added c to the structure. Otherwise
we could not calculate the aspect.
Typological Note. Spatial systems make use of obvious landmarks
such as: rivers (“upstream”, “downstream”) and shorelines (“seawards”,
a general feature of Austronesian spatial talk, see the collection (Ben-
nardo 2002). Others use the sun (east is where the sun rises, west is
where it sets) or winds (e.g. the monsoon).
6. CALIBRATING THE SPACE
In the first step we have allowed the origin of space to be adjusted
locally. This sidesteps the calculation of absolute coordinates. However,
we will still have to calculate relative coordinates. This will require two
more things: we need to fix directions and we need to fix unit vectors
in these directions.
We do the second first. Consider again the notion of nearness. Sup-
pose we are being asked whether the moon would be near the earth if it
were 100 km away from earth. Presumably we would say yes. But a cat
that is 100 km away from a mat is definitely not near it. So, nearness
actually does not answer to absolute distance but only to relative dis-
tance, which is dimensionless, that is, a number. One solution would be
to calculate the size of the ground object, the size of the figure and then
see whether the distance is a large or small multiple of these numbers.
(I will not say much about the exact details of how exactly “near” is com-
puted. Something like the larger of the diameters of figure and ground
seems to go into it, minimally.) The diameter of a region r, d∅(r), may
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in first approximation be set to the supremum of the numbers d(o, o′),
o, o′ ∈ r. On the other hand, d(r, s) = inf{d(o, o′) : o ∈ r, o′ ∈ s}, which
is zero for closed sets if and only if the intersection is nonempty.3 So,
for nearness we look at the ratio d(r, s)/max{d∅(r), d∅(s)}. This is a
real number. So we have a scale.
This only works for regions. There is another concept of scale, call
it external, where rather than looking at the diameters of the objects,
we look at some external measure (humans, etc). Thus, I may say that
I am near your house just because going there will not take long, not
because the distance is a small multiple of the size of the house. But
comparatively the distance might be large if only the bicycle and the
house are considered.
[Step 2]
The number 1 is assigned a set of vectors K , called the unit
ball. The members are called unit vectors. The length of
a given vector ~v is that number λ such that the multiple
1/λ · ~v is a unit vector.
This means that given ~v, we find a ~u ∈ K such that 1/λ · ~v = ~u. This
~u is unique (by assumption on K) and therefore λ is unique as well.
Hence ~v = λ~u, so the length counts how many multiples of the unit
vector ~u we need to take to get ~v.
When we have set up a scale we can talk of lengths. Each vector
is given a length, which is a real number. The aspect of the space has
changed again. We now have, in addition to the group structure on the
vectors, also a function assigning length. Thus we have what is called a
normed vector space or a metric vector space. (Norms give lengths, ||~v|| is
the length of ~v. Metrics give distances: d(~v, ~w) is the distance between
~v and ~w, and is identical to ||~v− ~w||.) If the metric is rotation invariant
we may just as well single out just one vector as a unit vector instead
of the entire set K . (Think of the prototype meter in Paris.)
7. SETTING UP THE COORDINATE FRAME
In addition to concepts like “near” we also have those that point in a
certain direction, like “north”, “left”, “seaward”, and so on. When we
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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say
(3) Edinburgh is north of London.
we position Edinburgh in relation to London as the origin of a coor-
dinate frame. (Mind you, we can do the converse too by saying that
London is south of Edinburgh...) Doing this however requires singling
out a particular vector called “north”. It is unique, since it must be of
length 1 and point northward. Similarly,
(4) John is to my left.
asserts that John is found by following from myself as origin in the left-
hand direction.
Indeed, so many spatial PPs involve such expressions that we can say
that the most important step (judging also from the literature on spatial
language) is setting up the coordinate frame. We do that by positioning
what is called a virtual observer in the origin. This observer defines the
six cardinal directions, right, left, front, back, up and down. Obviously,
only three of them are needed. Now that we have the center c and
the unit ball K , we choose three vectors, ~e1, ~e2 and ~e3 to represent the
three cardinal directions, called front, right and up. We assume them
to be linearly independent. Once this is done, for each vector ~v there
are unique numbers γ1, γ2 and γ3 such that
(5) ~v = γ1 · ~e1 + γ2 · ~e2 + γ3 · ~e3
The triple (γ1,γ2,γ3) is the coordinate vector of ~v. The map f2 : ~v 7→
(γ1,γ2,γ3) is a bijection from V onto R
3. (By now, V and R3 have
assumed the structure of normed vector spaces.)
One small wrinkle must be addressed. In order for this to work we
need some additional structure, a scalar product 〈·, ·〉 compatible with
our norm. Such a structure is called an inner product space. Scalar
products are bilinear forms, that is, maps from V × V to R which are
linear in both arguments. They make it possible to define angles be-
tween vectors, and, importantly, orthogonality. We say ~v is orthogonal
to ~y if 〈~x , ~y〉 = 0.
This is the second step. The function f2 is an aspect of the vector
space V. Thus, by composition, f2 ◦ f1 is an aspect of the original space
O. At this point we can address the points as triples of numbers.
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Typological Note. The problem of setting up coordinate frames has
been recognized for a long time. I only refer to Levinson (1996) and
Levinson (2003). The idea that there is a special morpheme, called Ax-
Part, responsible for hosting the frame has been proposed by Svenonius,
see e. g. Svenonius (2008). Expressions for (absolute) cardinal direc-
tions need denote orthogonal directions, see Palmer (2002). However,
this just means that the expressions do not share the same coordinate
frame, that is, a single language can use different methods for con-
structing coordinate frames even for absolute directions.
8. POSITIONING THE FIGURE
The space is set up: we have put on two lenses in sequences through
which we can take a view. We are now ready to position the figure.
Look at the sentence
(6) The cat is on the mat.
Here, as with (2), we have the mat as the origin of the space. In addi-
tion, to get at the meaning of “on”, we make use of the cardinal direc-
tions from the coordinate frame. We select the direction “up”. More-
over, the distance of figure from ground is 0 (they are touching). Oth-
erwise we should have used “above”. Actually, I am undecided whether
the direction to use is always ~e1, with the others being ancillary at best,
or whether we take the idea of the virtual observer seriously and let ~e1
be “front”, so that “up” is ~e3. For the purpose of this paper I choose the
second option.
The point of the coordinate frame can now be put quite succinctly.
After all recoding we only need to look at the coordinate γ3 for points of
the figure. If its infimum is 0, the sentence is true, and false otherwise.
The recoding has made complex computations unnecessary.
Typological Note. Above AxPart we find another head, the localizer.
There are case systems that show clearly the presence of a distinct head;
Avar, Finnish, Hungarian, Tsez case systems are of that kind (see Kracht
(2002)).
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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9. TRACKING THE FIGURE
When Michael Schumacher is trying to get ahead of Mikka Häkkinen in
a race we cannot really assume that Mikka is standing still. Neither, of
course, is Michael. After all this is a race. But at the same time, if he is
unsuccessful, we would assert
(7) Schumacher stayed behind Häkkinen.
This suggests that nothing is changing in terms of position. This appar-
ent contradiction has a simple explanation.
Positioning the figure is done at a particular time point. Events usu-
ally take some time to unfold, so we do a positioning of the figure at
each time point during the entire event. What is crucial is that the
ground is the origin of the coordinate frame, regardless of whether or
not it is in motion. Thus, motion of the figure is described relative to
that of the ground (remember Mach’s Principle). We may or may not
be aware of the fact that the ground is in motion (cognitively speak-
ing, not physically), but the linguistics of spatial PPs prescribe that they
record motion relative to ground.
(7) is not expressing change in the sense of the local PP “behind
Häkkinen”. During the event time, Schumacher is locked into that po-
sition. At the same time we can assert that he is racing past the visitors
at 250 km per hour. Still, the truth of “be behind Häkkinen” remains
unchanged.
Again, the trick is done by the aspect. It is by using the aspect as
induced by the PP that evaluation of the sentence becomes trivial. Just
let the coordinate frame be such that Häkkinen’s car is the center, and ~e1
points in direction of its motion (= “front”). Then −~e1 points towards
Schumacher throughout event time. That’s it.
Typological Note. Niikanne (2003) notes that in Finnish there are
three types of Ps: those that require motion of the ground (edellä “in
front of”), those that require the ground to be at rest (edustalla “in the
front of”), and those that are indifferent (edessä “in front of”).
There is a separate head that talks about the change of truth. Fong
(1997) deals with such heads in terms of phase quantification. See
Kracht (2008) for an expansion of that idea. Languages with heads
devoted to expressing phase quantification include Finnish and Hun-
garian, see Kracht (2002).
Vol. 10: Perspectives on Spatial Cognition
13 Marcus Kracht
10. MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS AGAIN
So now everything seems to fall in place. As we move upwards in the
hierarchy, space gets coded up in different ways, and the meanings of
the newly added heads just take these encoded meanings as inputs.
However, there is a problem to solve. As I noted in Kracht (2008), we
shall need a double accounting to keep track of locations. One layer
contains information about the objects under the encoding scheme, the
other contains information about the encoding function itself.
This essentially means that simplicity is gained by outsourcing the
complications into some clever encoding. This can hardly be called a
solution. Moreover, the truth conditions can only be effectively deter-
mined if both the representation and the encoding are simultaneously
known.
I have as yet no answer to this complaint. However, I wish to point
out that when it comes to our mental models as well as our way of
accessing real space we are always dependent on a certain coding, and
this coding is changing quite frequently. When pointing at a red dot on
a map saying: “This is Berlin.” we are not actually pointing at the city
of Berlin; we can be said to point at it only under the tacit assumption
that there is a code relating points on paper to points in real space.
Although we may not even be aware of what exactly that coding is,
the reference is nevertheless successful, at least for practical purposes.
We can see that this is what is going on by looking at situations where
things go wrong. We may think, for example, that New Zealand is close
to Australia since the map visually tells us so. For on the map Australia
has the size of France. To correct this, we must realize that the two maps
are of different scales. Of course, this assumes that we are talking about
an absolute notion of nearness, that is, distance rather than nearness.
When we mean nearness in relative terms, scale does not matter.
Not only that: we are unable to look at space as it really is, we
picture locations by means of internal maps that we can resize, turn
around and so on. These maps show a coherence also with respect to
each other. The coding functions discussed above treat these maps as
something that gives names to objects. The more we code, the more
complicated it gets. Viewed from inside, it is not the addresses that get
complicated, it is the outside world. When Michael Schumacher sits in
his car, he can see Mikka right in front of him. He has no trouble track-
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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ing his location. Only the viewers are experiencing some difficulties.
From their perspective, to decide whether Michael makes an attempt
at overtaking Mikka requires good eyesight and attention. One must
not lose track of either car since one needs to calculate some relative
differences in their positions.
Ultimately, we need to acknowledge that Ernst Mach was right.
When I return to the beautiful lecture hall of the university of Riga
on the next day, the reason that I confidently say that I have been in
that location before is not that I can recognize the space points in the
aether. It is not that I have an ability to somehow track my physical
motion in the metrical space time. We know that I can’t. What I really
want to say therefore is that I recognize that lecture hall. I remember
the location by way of remembering the things that inhabit it. Just as I
remember events not by the time stamp they get but by the order they
have in the overall chain of events. That I was here yesterday is again
not saying that some absolute portion of time passed between then and
now of which I possess direct evidence. It is saying that there was night
in between them.
We get something of a Kantian theme here. Outer space is a men-
tal construct: we construct locations by means of objects that inhabit
them. That it may ultimately be easier to use that construct as a con-
tainer for dumping our mental furniture is just a mental convenience.
However, from the standpoint of evaluating linguistic expressions, we
need to go all the way. Essentially, we can evaluate expressions not
thinking of them as codes of anything but thinking of them as objects in
their own right. We thus have no single model that explains everything
(transcendental space, if you like), but a progression of them, between
which we can shift in systematic and predictable ways.
11. ASPECT
The term “aspect” has a long history in linguistics. So why use it for
something entirely different? The answer is that it is actually not dif-
ferent. As far as I can see the same problems of positioning an event
arise in the domain of time. We speak of “progressive aspect” when
some event “is still going on”. But what does that mean? From a model
theoretic perspective that makes no sense: events are not going on, they
Vol. 10: Perspectives on Spatial Cognition
15 Marcus Kracht
have a temporal trace. Just like objects aren’t simply present, they have
a location.
What is true of locations is true of time points as well: they are
not absolute, only relative. There is no unique “zero” (choose between
ab urbe condita (birth of Rome), birth of Christ, first Olympic games,
January 1, 1970 (the beginning of “the epoch” of Linux), and many
more). That an event is going on can be said only relative to some other
event (Klein 1994). Thus, when speaking of time, the same process of
picking a reference point and scaling the measure of duration can be
observed. And since they go under the name “aspect”, I think calling
this phenomenon for space “spatial aspect” is justified.
12. CONCLUSION
When faced with spatial expressions, we are tempted to follow the
traditional path of Cartesian coordinates: locate points via coordinate
triples, and use those in the computation of local relations. However,
such a procedure is only useful when such coordinate triples are readily
available. The fact is that they are not. Bypassing the need to compute
coordinates of both figure and ground is the key to understanding the
peculiar nature of PPs, for example, that they do not answer to absolute
motion of the figure, only to relative motion with respect to the ground.
Notes
1I wish to thank Jurgis Skilters and Michael Glanzberg for their enthusiasm and for
providing me feedback on this paper. Also, many thanks András Kornai and to the partic-
ipants in the workshop, in particular Yoad Winter and Peter Gaerdenfors, for their critical
evaluation.
2I mention here in passing that the matter is far from settled. Relativistic physics uses
the notion of an inertial system, which is a system that is in constant motion. In an
accelerated system, time slows down, for example. But how can a system tell it is inertial
(see Esfeld (2012))? Thanks to Michael Glanzberg for bringing up this point.
3I take regions to be path connected closed sets. Contact between them requires over-
lap. The complications of this view are discussed in Smith (2007) and need not concern
us here.
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